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“DON’T BLAME ME, BLAME THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS”:  A SURVEY OF DISMISSAL RULINGS IN 
10b-5 SUITS FOR SUBPRIME SECURITIES LOSSES 
Christopher J. Miller*
 
 
This Note surveys thirty-four district court decisions on motions to 
dismiss in actions brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 for losses suffered during 
the recent financial crisis.  This Note focuses on issues of scienter and loss 
causation, the elements of a 10b-5 claim most likely to be affected by a 
market-wide downturn.  In the opinions surveyed, successfully pleading 
scienter proved the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs in surviving a motion to 
dismiss, and this Note proceeds to analyze the factors that influenced 
whether a district court found scienter to be adequately pleaded.  This Note 
also examines efforts by both plaintiffs and defendants to use the financial 
crisis of 2007–08 to support their arguments for or against dismissal, again 
with particular focus on scienter and loss causation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers announced that it would file 
for bankruptcy.1  The 150-year-old firm was not the first victim of the 
growing crisis—the rushed sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America had 
been completed just a few days prior, and earlier that year Bear Stearns had 
been forced into the arms of JPMorgan Chase & Co.2
 
 1. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
16, 2008, at A1. 
  In response, the 
United States stock market suffered its worst daily drop since the 
 2. See Aaron Lucchetti & Robin Sidel, Dow Industrials Take a 504.48-Point Dive, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at C1. 
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September 11th terrorist attacks.3  In October 2010, the IMF estimated total 
bank losses from the financial crisis at $2.2 trillion.4
The tidal wave of litigation that has followed in the wake of the financial 
crisis has ranged from bribery cases
 
5 to public nuisance complaints.6
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SECURITIES LAWS 
  This 
Note focuses only on one aspect of this maelstrom:  suits brought under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws.  Part I gives 
background information on the financial crisis and the federal securities 
laws, with a particular focus on the elements of scienter and loss causation.  
Part II first gives an overview of securities litigation in the wake of the 
crisis.  Part II then reviews the dispositions of motions to dismiss in thirty-
four suits for subprime securities losses, concluding that adequately 
alleging scienter has been the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs hoping to survive 
a motion to dismiss, and then proceeds to analyze issues that have proved 
important in adequately alleging scienter.  Part III examines the efforts of 
plaintiffs and defendants to use the crisis itself to prevail on motions to 
dismiss in the thirty-four decisions surveyed.  Finally, Part IV provides 
concluding observations on securities litigation in the wake of financial 
catastrophe. 
This part first gives some brief background information on the financial 
crisis.  Next, the historical development of the federal securities laws is 
examined.  Finally, this part discusses the evolution of the current standards 
for loss causation and scienter in private actions under Rule 10b-5. 
A.  Financial Crisis:  Attack of the Opaque Acronyms 
1.  Mortgage Loan Origination 
Home ownership usually depends on the availability of credit.  
Individuals with strong credit histories qualify for traditional mortgages, 
while individuals with weaker histories qualify for subprime loans.7
 
 3. See Craig et al., supra note 
  The 
importance of subprime mortgages to the overall mortgage market has 
increased over time—the percentage of mortgages originated that were 
1, at A1. 
 4. INT’L MONETARY FUND, OCTOBER 2010 GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT x 
(2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, J.P. Morgan Settles Alabama Bribery Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at B1. 
 6. See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming dismissal of City’s claims that subprime foreclosures constituted a public 
nuisance caused by defendant financial institutions’ securitization practices). 
 7. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from 
the 2007–08 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED:  SECURITIZATION AFTER THE 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 163, 167 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan 
eds., 2009).  Banks customarily have charged higher interest rates to buyers considered to be 
at a higher risk of defaulting on their loans based on, for example, poor credit history or a 
small down payment compared to the overall value of the loan. See Rick Brooks & 
Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1. 
276 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
rated subprime increased from 8.6 percent in 2001 ($190 billion) to 20 
percent by 2005 (over $600 billion).8  Many of these later mortgages were 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).9  One of the most common subprime 
ARMs was given the label “2/28,” because it gave the borrower a low fixed 
rate (a “teaser rate”) for the first two years, and then reset to a high variable 
rate for the next twenty-eight.10  After the reset, a buyer’s monthly payment 
could jump by 35 percent or more, even if market interest rates had not 
changed.11  For subprime buyers, who often could afford the teaser rate but 
not the higher variable rate, this jump would create a need to refinance after 
two years in order to afford their monthly payments.12  Because a 
significant number of subprime borrowers had borrowed the entire value of 
their home, a decline in housing prices could leave them owing more than 
the value of their home (“under water”) and unable to refinance.13  Without 
refinancing, they were likely to default on their monthly payments; thus 
ARMs left subprime borrowers with little flexibility to survive a drop in 
housing prices.14
Commercial banks and savings and loan associations were once the 
predominant originators of mortgage loans—however, with the advent of 
securitization, mortgage bankers
 
15 and brokers had the majority of the 
market share by the 1990s.16  The market also consolidated:  in 1990, 28 
percent of the industry’s roughly $500 billion in loans came from the top 
twenty-five originators; in 2005, 85 percent of the industry’s $3.1 trillion in 
loans did.17
2.  Securitization 
 
Securitization refers to the process of pooling together assets that are not 
otherwise easily traded, including mortgages and credit card loans, and 
issuing securities that allow investors to receive payments based on cash 
flows from that pool.18
 
 8. See Bethel et al., supra note 
  The resulting securities are called asset-backed 
securities (ABS), of which mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are one 
7, at 167–68. See also David Schmudde, Responding to 
the Subprime Mess:  The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 
722–24 (2009). 
 9. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 167–68. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., SUBPRIME AND SYNTHETIC CDOS:  STRUCTURE, RISK, 
AND VALUATION 11 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_CDOs_
Structure_Risk_Valuation_0610.pdf.  
 12. See id. 
 13. See id.; see also Schmudde, supra note 8, at 719–21. 
 14. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 11; see also Schmudde, supra note 8, at 
719–21. 
 15. Mortgage banks do not take deposits and are significantly less regulated than 
commercial banks; Countrywide is one example. See Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for 
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1254–56, 1272–73 (2010). 
 16. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. 
 17. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 169. 
 18. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. 
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type.19  Sponsors of MBS purchase the loans from the originators; when a 
large enough pool of mortgages is assembled, it is sold to a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) that issues MBS in order to fund its purchase of the 
mortgages.20  MBS are split into “tranches.”21  Scheduled payments to 
some investors—those holding the more senior tranches—are prioritized 
over payments to investors holding less senior tranches.22  These MBS cash 
flows represent the interest and principal payments made by the borrowers 
whose mortgages are owned by the MBS structures.23
A hypothetical can help demonstrate how these tranches prioritize 
payments.  Imagine a MBS has $100 worth of underlying collateral in the 
form of residential mortgages.  The most senior tranche of this hypothetical 
MBS has 20 percent subordination, which means it is entitled to all of the 
cash flow from the underlying mortgages until 80 percent of the debt is 
satisfied.  Thus, if only $80 of the scheduled payments are made, perhaps 
because of homeowner defaults, the senior tranche will be paid in full, 
while the lower tranches will receive nothing.  Each tranche is rated by 
rating agencies for its investment quality, with the most senior tranches 
receiving AAA ratings and the less senior, riskier tranches receiving lower 
ratings.
 
24
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) share many traits with MBS.  
CDOs have been around since the late 1980s, but their growth as an asset 
class occurred primarily after 2000.
 
25  A CDO has been analogized to “a 
small, privately held finance firm with a [limited] lifespan.”26  A CDO is an 
independent legal entity that owns assets such as MBS.27  A cash-based 
CDO issues debt classes, and pays them with the cash flows from the MBS 
it owns.28  Synthetic CDOs, meanwhile, derive their cash flows from credit 
default swaps (CDS), a form of credit insurance on a portfolio of reference 
entities, which could include high-grade corporate bonds, but might also 
include MBS.29
 
 19. Id.  Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) are an even more specific sub-
classification of ABSs that distinguishes securities derived from residential mortgages from 
securities based upon commercial mortgages. 
  As with MBS, all CDO debt classes are divided into 
 20. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 170. 
 21. Tranche is the French word for slice. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY, 1327 (11th ed. 2003).  Each tranche is a slice of the entity as a whole owned by 
a class of investors with certain rights. Id. 
 22. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 169. 
 23. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8. 
 24. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 170.  The ratings given by rating agencies are 
based upon the perceived likelihood that an investment will fail.  The most senior tranche in 
MBS would receive the highest rating, AAA, because it was considered extremely unlikely 
that so many of the mortgages pooled into the MBS would default that the lower tranches 
would be unable to absorb the entire loss. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF 
CAPITALISM 52 (2009). 
 25. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8; JANET M. TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED 
DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 6–13 (2003). 
 26. BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 8. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 14.  The cash stream is derived from the premiums paid on the CDSs by 
the insured. See id.; TAVAKOLI, supra note 25, at 31. 
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tranches by seniority.30  A key difference between cash-based and synthetic 
CDOs is the way liabilities are funded:  cash-based CDOs are fully funded, 
meaning that investors pay in advance for their bonds.31  Synthetic CDOs, 
however, include an unfunded class (usually the super-senior tranches) that 
need not put any money down initially, but may be subject to calls requiring 
them to put up cash to fund payments should large credit events (e.g., mass 
defaults in the underlying assets) significantly disrupt cash flow.32  Finally, 
adding to the complexity, CDOs will sometimes own tranches of other 
CDOs as part of their portfolio; depending on the portion of the portfolio 
that consists of other CDOs, these may be referred to as CDOs-squared.33
3.  Crisis 
 
Housing prices began to decline nationally by mid-2006, dropping by 
about 1.5 percent between 2006 and 2007.34  Interest rates increased at a 
time when over two million homeowners faced the first interest-rate resets 
on their ARMs.35  Moreover, the rating agency Fitch found that poor 
underwriting standards and outright fraud were driving the 
underperformance of many subprime loans.36
With default rates unexpectedly high, banks sought to enforce repurchase 
agreements, requiring lenders to buy back troubled mortgages.
 
37  These 
thinly capitalized loan originators faced financial distress—by the end of 
2007, more than twenty-five subprime mortgage originators had filed for 
bankruptcy, including New Century Financial Corp.38  Nor was the wave of 
bankruptcies limited to subprime lenders; even lenders without significant 
subprime portfolios fell as investors fled the mortgage market.39  The 
unexpectedly high default rates on subprime mortgages also caused rating 
agencies to downgrade their ratings of MBS and CDOs.40  Financial 
institutions then had to write down these assets as their value became 
impaired.41
 
 30. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 
  Because of these write-downs, firms needed to raise capital to 
meet regulatory requirements by selling unwanted mortgage-related assets; 
with so many firms seeking to do so at the same time, the market for these 
assets was glutted and illiquid, and firms faced steep discounts on asset 
11, at 8. 
 31. See id. at 15. 
 32. See id. at 14–15; TAVAKOLI, supra note 25, at 197. 
 33. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 13. 
 34. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 180. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch:  Underwriting & Fraud Significant Drivers 
of Subprime Defaults; New Originator Reviews (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/Fitch_Originators_1128.pdf. 
 37. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Banks Go on Subprime Offensive, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
13, 2007, at A3. 
 38. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 182. 
 39. See American Home Mortgage Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C3; Kemba J. Dunham, Subprime Woes Slap Other Lenders, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at B7. 
 40. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 183. 
 41. See id. at 182–84; see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 68. 
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prices.42  The write-downs and deeply discounted asset sales raised fears in 
the market about the creditworthiness of financial institutions.43  The result 
was a run on the funding of banks; while “in the Great Depression, 
depositors of commercial banks withdrew their deposits, here providers of 
capital withdrew secured and unsecured funding from banks.”44  The 
impact on the financial services sector was massive—Bear Stearns and 
Merrill Lynch were sold,45 Lehman Brothers went bankrupt,46 and Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs became commercial bank holding companies 
instead of investment banks.47  The damage was not contained to the 
financial services sector:  commercial banks, including IndyMac Bancorp, 
were taken into federal receivership.48  The federal government also seized 
control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac49 and the troubled insurance giant 
AIG.50
Total losses from the financial collapse are estimated in the trillions, and 
responses by governments and private actors have varied widely.
 
51
B.  The Securities Acts 
  The 
private 10b-5 action is one tool by which investors have sought to recoup 
their losses, which is especially fitting considering the historical context in 
which that action developed. 
Modern securities laws have their origins in another historic financial 
catastrophe:  the stock market crash of 1929.52  The “industrial prosperity” 
of the decade leading up to the Great Depression led to a historic rise in the 
trading, valuation, and underwriting of securities.53  Many Americans 
gambled on securities with borrowed funds, often making no attempt to 
establish whether the prices had any foundation in the success of the issuing 
companies.54  The lack of fair dealing by some underwriters and dealers 
aided this speculation—such distributors made statements to prospective 
purchasers without proper investigation of their truth, and used misleading 
literature and high-pressure sales tactics.55
 
 42. See Bethel et al., supra note 
  Once the rampant speculation 
7, at 183–84; see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 66–67. 
 43. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 183–84. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Luchetti & Sidel, supra note 2. 
 46. See Craig et al., supra note 1. 
 47. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Radical Shift for Goldman and Morgan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A1 (“Now, the firms will look more like commercial banks, with 
more disclosure, higher capital reserves and less risk-taking.”). 
 48. Robin Sidel, Bank Fears Spread After Seizure of IndyMac, WALL ST. J., July 14, 
2008, at A1. 
 49. Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, a Few Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 50. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central 
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 51. See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 4. 
 52. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1976). 
 53. See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C. 
18 (1948). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 19–20. 
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reached its breaking point, the severity of the stock market crash and the 
sheer number of people who suffered losses “led inevitably to [calls] for 
legislative reform.”56
The main focus of the resulting legislation was ensuring proper 
disclosure of information by issuers and underwriters.  Within a month of 
his inauguration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a message to 
Congress emphasizing the importance of information disclosure, stating that 
his government had “an obligation . . . to insist that every issue of new 
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full 
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element 
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”
 
57  With this 
aim in mind, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (‘33 Act), which 
protects investors by requiring extensive disclosures before new securities 
are issued.58  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) expanded this 
protection by requiring periodic disclosures with respect to previously 
issued securities in order to prevent the manipulation of stock prices.59  The 
‘34 Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
oversee enforcement and rulemaking under both the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts.60
1.  Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5 
 
Section 10(b) is arguably the most important and expansive provision of 
the Securities Acts, providing the SEC with broad authority to prohibit 
manipulative or deceptive conduct connected with the purchase or sale of a 
security.61
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.
  Under section 10(b), it is unlawful to: 
62
In 1942, the SEC used its congressionally authorized rulemaking 
authority to enact Rule 10b-5, which specifically describes the conduct 
barred by section 10(b).
 
63  Though Rule 10b-5 would ultimately prove to be 
one of the foremost anti-fraud provisions in federal law, its creation was not 
the result of precise and careful legislative deliberation.  Instead, the Rule 
was “a hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional 
misconduct.”64
 
 56. See id. at 20. 
  The SEC had learned that the president of a corporation 
 57. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
 58. 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)); see also Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1976) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, at 1-5 (1933)). 
 59. 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)) (‘34 Act). 
 60. Id. § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
 61. See Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Scheme Liability:  Rule 10b-5(a) and Secondary 
Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. LITIG. 183, 186 (2007). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 64. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 n.32 (1976). 
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was telling shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and 
purchasing their shares at low prices, when in fact the company was doing 
exceptionally well.65  The rule was drafted and approved on the day the 
SEC learned of this misconduct.66
Rule 10b-5 is “as broad as almost any statute, a sort of long-arm 
provision in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to 
forbid.”
 
67  Despite this breadth, Congress has never expressly provided for 
a private right of action for violation of section 10(b).68  Since 1946, 
however, courts have recognized that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 create 
an implied private right of action.69  While some commentators have 
objected that implying a private right of action goes against congressional 
intent,70 the United States Supreme Court itself has stated that the implied 
remedy’s “existence . . . is simply beyond peradventure.”71
2.  Loss Causation and Scienter:  Common Law Development 
 
The implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 “resembles, but is 
not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and 
misrepresentation.”72  The Supreme Court has identified six elements of a 
claim for securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:  (1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance (transaction causation), (5) 
economic loss, and (6) loss causation.73
 
 65. Id. 
  This Note focuses on loss 
causation and scienter.  These two elements of a plaintiff’s claim are most 
likely to be affected by the global financial crisis.  In regards to loss 
causation, this is because of the issue of intervening causation—the 
possibility that the investor’s loss was caused by the market-wide downturn 
 66. Id.  Rule 10b-5 states in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 67. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990). 
 68. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-
Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008). 
 69. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (citing Kardon 
v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) as the first time a private right of 
action under Rule 10b-5 was recognized). 
 70. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks:  Implied Rights of Action Under 
the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62 (2004). 
 71. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380. 
 72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 73. See id. at 341–42. 
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in share prices and not the defendant’s misrepresentations.74  In regards to 
scienter, this is because of the rule against pleading “fraud by hindsight” to 
hold defendants responsible for failing to predict future events.75  Some 
scholars predicted that these two elements would be most difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove in the wake of the financial collapse.76
a.  Loss Causation 
 
In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,77 the Second Circuit recognized 
the term “loss causation” as a required component of a 10b-5 claim.78  The 
court opined that loss causation can be demonstrated “rather easily by proof 
of some form of economic damage,” compared with the reliance element of 
transaction causation.79  Indeed, transaction causation received more 
attention by courts than loss causation for many years, until the Supreme 
Court greatly eased a plaintiff’s burden by accepting the “fraud on the 
market” theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,80 creating a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance where materially misleading statements are 
disseminated into a well-developed, impersonal market.81
Courts continued to emphasize loss causation’s foundation in common 
law tort, with Judge Richard Posner going so far as to state that “what 
securities lawyers call ‘loss causation’ is the standard common law fraud 
rule . . . merely borrowed for use in federal securities fraud cases.”
 
82  The 
Second Circuit, meanwhile, has stated that the “tort analogy is imperfect” 
because while “[a] foreseeable injury at common law is one proximately 
caused by the defendant’s fault,” devaluation of a security is caused by “the 
underlying circumstance that is concealed or misstated,” not the 
misstatement itself.83  Despite these differences, the common law 
development of the loss causation element informed its ultimate 
codification in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199584
b.  Scienter 
 
(PSLRA). 
The requirement that any material misstatements be made with scienter is 
perhaps less intuitive than the requirement of a causal connection between 
 
 74. See infra Parts I.B.4.a.ii, III.B, and IV.B.2. 
 75. See infra Parts I.B.4.b, III.A, and IV.B.1. 
 76. See Bethel et al., supra note 7, at 204–14. 
 77. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 78. See id. at 380. 
 79. Id.  Transaction causation involves showing “that the violations in question caused 
the [plaintiff] to engage in the transaction in question.” Id. 
 80. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 81. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern:  Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 811, 817–19 (2009). 
 82. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 83. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 84. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.); see Fisch, supra note 81, at 822. 
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the misstatements and the loss suffered by an investor.  Indeed, in the thirty-
year period following the establishment of a private right of action under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, “[c]ourts and commentators . . . differed with 
regard to whether scienter is a necessary element of such a cause of action, 
or whether negligent conduct alone is sufficient.”85  The Supreme Court 
resolved this dispute in 1976 with its decision in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder.86  The Court held that Congress’s use of the word 
“manipulative” and other words indicative of intentional or willful conduct 
indicated congressional intent to proscribe a type of wrongful conduct 
exceeding negligence.87
The Circuit Courts of Appeals were in agreement that the heightened 
pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applied to this 
scienter element.
 
88  Rule 9(b) requires the circumstances of a fraud to be 
pleaded with particularity, but allows that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”89  The 
Circuits split, however, on the interpretation of Rule 9(b) in the securities 
context.  The Ninth Circuit had the least demanding standard, merely 
requiring a plaintiff to state that scienter existed.90  On the opposite end of 
the spectrum, the Second Circuit had the most demanding standard, 
requiring a plaintiff to state, with particularity, facts that give rise to a 
“strong inference” of scienter.91
3.  Congress Acts:  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
  The uncertainty and inconsistency arising 
from this split in standards was one of the reasons that Congress enacted the 
PSLRA. 
The PSLRA codified the judicially developed elements of a section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 claim, including loss causation and scienter.  In 1995, 
Congress sought to “reassert its authority” in the area of 10b-5 litigation.92
 
 85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
  
Organized efforts to reform private securities litigation had begun in 1991, 
when the “Big Six” accounting firms and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants began to build bipartisan support for 
legislative action to rein in what they saw as an overly plaintiff-friendly 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 199. 
 88. See James B. Fipp, Case Note, How Strong Is Strong Enough?:  The Tellabs Court 
Lacked the Needed Strength for Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud, 8 WYO. L. REV. 629, 
636 (2008) (citing In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994)); see 
also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(acknowledging that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to securities fraud); 
Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) applies to actions brought under the federal securities laws). 
 89. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 90. See In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546–47. 
 91. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. 
 92. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683–84. 
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system of securities litigation.93  Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to 
combat abusive practices in private securities litigation.94  Congress was 
concerned primarily with preventing “strike suits”—shareholder suits filed 
solely for their settlement value, not because of a meritorious claim.95  
Faced with expensive discovery, “deep pocket” defendants would settle 
otherwise non-meritorious claims, and cases were generally “settled based 
not on the merits but on the size of the defendant’s pocketbook.”96
The PSLRA had three primary goals:  “(1) to encourage the voluntary 
disclosure of information by corporate issuers; (2) to empower investors so 
that they—not their lawyers—exercise primary control over private 
securities litigation; and (3) to encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue valid 
claims and defendants to fight abusive claims.”
 
97  To that end, the PSLRA 
sought to heighten and standardize the pleading requirements for section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suits.  Congress adopted the Second Circuit’s 
standard for pleading scienter,98 requiring that a plaintiff must “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”99  Congress did not, however, define the 
key term “strong inference,” leaving it up to the Supreme Court to clarify 
the standard at a later time.100
As to loss causation, the PSLRA stated only that “the plaintiff shall have 
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to 
violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages.”
 
101
 
 93. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995:  Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1018 (1996). 
  Thus, while the PSLRA codified the elements of a section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 suit, it left the details of the pleading standards to be 
determined by the courts. 
 94. See David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1809 (2000). 
 95. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-50, at 15 (1995) (“Strike lawsuits are lawsuits filed by class action attorneys 
on behalf of shareholders whose once attractive stock purchases have failed to live up to 
their expectations.  Volatile stock prices, rapid product development, and technological 
changes make growing companies a target.  As a result, high technology, biotechnology, and 
other growth companies are hardest hit.”). 
 96. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 688. 
 97. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683. 
 98. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694.  The Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs “chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading 
standard of the Second Circuit.” Id.  The Senate Committee noted, however, that it did “not 
intend to codify the Second Circuit’s caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although 
courts may find this body of law instructive.” Id. 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2006). 
 100. See infra Part I.B.4.b. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4). 
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4.  The Supreme Court Clarifies:  Dura and Tellabs 
This section explains the current state of the pleading requirements for 
loss causation and scienter in light of the Supreme Court’s most recent 
decisions on the topic.  First, this section analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.  This section also 
examines a Second Circuit opinion that directly addressed the effect of an 
intervening cause on pleading loss causation, Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co.  Finally, this section discusses the Supreme Court’s decision addressing 
scienter, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 
a.  Loss Causation:  Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo and Lentell v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co. 
i.  Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,102 the Supreme Court 
formalized the requirement that a misrepresentation must be the proximate 
cause of a 10b-5 plaintiff’s loss.  The Ninth Circuit had ruled that a plaintiff 
may satisfy the loss causation element solely by demonstrating that the 
price of the stock was inflated on the date of purchase.103  A unanimous 
Supreme Court overruled, holding that the plaintiff must prove that the 
alleged misrepresentation is the proximate cause of the loss suffered.104  
The Court reasoned that while purchasing stock at a price inflated by a 
misrepresentation might often lead to a later loss, it is far from invariably 
so.105
 
 102. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
  Rather, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor 
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or 
other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of 
 103. See id. at 343.  There is currently a split between the circuits on the pleading 
standard for loss causation after Dura. See Evan Hill, Note, The Rule 10b-5 Suit:  Loss 
Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2677–78 (2010).  The Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits require a plaintiff to allege the misrepresentations plausibly caused their loss. 
See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 258 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Gilead Scis. Sec. 
Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Fifth Circuit explicitly interprets this 
plausible causation requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), while the Ninth 
Circuit “also appears to consider FRCP 8(a) appropriate, although without expressly stating 
so.” Hill, supra, at 2677–78.  The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have a more stringent 
standard, with the Fourth Circuit explicitly applying FRCP Rule 9(b) and the Seventh Circuit 
requiring plaintiffs to plead the “very facts” that caused their loss. See id.  Finally, plaintiffs 
in the Second Circuit must satisfy a two-part test in pleading loss causation, and demonstrate 
that (1) the loss was foreseeable and (2) within the zone of the risk of the misrepresentation. 
See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173; see also ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 
87, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Lentell’s two-part test after Dura).  Significantly for 
this Note, the Second Circuit does not specify the stringency of pleading, instead stating that 
loss causation is a “fact-based inquiry and the degree of difficulty in pleading will be 
affected by [the] circumstances.” Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174. 
 104. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343. 
 105. Id. 
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that lower price.”106  This “tangle of factors” affecting price requires a 
plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentation caused a loss.107
Building on its holding that a plaintiff need prove proximate causation 
and economic loss, the Court moved on to discuss the requirement that a 
plaintiff plead such a loss.
 
108  In doing so, the Court presumed the 
applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to loss causation, 
which requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”109  The Court noted that ordinary pleading 
standards do not impose a high burden on plaintiffs, but indicated that it 
“should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff . . . to provide a defendant 
with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff 
has in mind.”110
ii.  Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. 
 
The Dura Court did not consider any other issues surrounding loss 
causation, and thus did not directly consider the effect an intervening event 
might have.  The Second Circuit in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,111
The plaintiffs in Lentell were a group of investors who alleged that 
Merrill Lynch, through its “star analyst” Henry M. Blodget, issued false and 
misleading reports recommending that investors purchase shares of two 
companies, 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Interliant, Inc.
 
however, delved deeper into the effect a non-fraud explanation might have 
on pleading loss causation. 
112  The crux of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint was that between May 12, 1999 and February 20, 
2001, Merrill Lynch recommended that investors buy stock in the two 
companies not because they were actually sound investments, but instead to 
further Merrill Lynch’s banking-client relationship with the companies and 
increase their share price.113  The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to plead 
loss causation, among other deficiencies.114
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, establishing a two-part test 
for pleading loss causation.
 
115  The court emphasized that proximate 
causation in securities fraud suits differs from causation in other torts in that 
the loss is not caused directly by the defendant’s fault, but by the 
underlying circumstance that is concealed or misstated.116
 
 106. Id.  
  Thus, the court 
held, a plaintiff must plead “both that the loss be foreseeable and that the 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 346. 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Dura, 544 U.S. at 346. 
 110. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347. 
 111. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 112. See id. at 164. 
 113. See id. at 166–67. 
 114. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 115. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173. 
 116. See id. 
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loss be caused by the materialization of the concealed risk.”117  Merrill 
Lynch did not actually conceal or misstate any of the actual underlying 
risks associated with an investment in 24/7 Media or Interliant; instead, the 
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch falsely recommended investment in 
those companies.118  Thus, because the plaintiffs did not allege that it was 
the falsity of these recommendations that caused the decline in their stock 
value, they did not properly plead loss causation.119
In the course of its opinion, the Second Circuit also discussed the impact 
a non-fraud explanation may have on pleading loss causation in one key 
passage.
 
120  After beginning by noting that “[l]oss causation is a fact-based 
inquiry and the degree of difficulty in pleading will be affected by the 
circumstances,”121 the Second Circuit quoted Emergent Capital Investment 
Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc.122 for the proposition that “[i]f 
[a plaintiff’s] loss was caused by an intervening event, like a general fall in 
the price of Internet stocks, the chain of causation . . . is a matter of proof at 
trial and not to be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”123  In the 
next sentence, however, the court quoted First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt 
Funding Corp.124 for the proposition that “when the plaintiff’s loss 
coincides with a market-wide phenomenon causing comparable losses to 
other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by the fraud 
decreases,” and a plaintiff’s claim fails when “it has not adequately [pled] 
facts which, if proven, would show that its loss was caused by the alleged 
misstatements as opposed to intervening events.”125
As one district court has observed, 
 
[T]his passage lacks clarity.  It provides no explanation for how “a 
general fall in the price of Internet stocks” is distinguishable from “a 
marketwide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other investors”—
the former of which is a matter for proof at trial, while the latter can be a 
sufficient basis on which to dismiss a complaint.126
Thus, district courts have had unclear guidance as they grapple with issues 
of loss causation in the wake of the financial crisis. 
 
b.  Scienter:  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,127
 
 117. Id. 
 the Supreme Court 
considered the then-extant split between the circuits on the level of 
 118. See id. at 175. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 174. 
 121. Id.  
 122. 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 123. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174 (quoting Emergent, 343 F.3d at 197). 
 124. 27 F.3d 763 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 125. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174 (quoting Gelt, 27 F.3d at 772). 
 126. King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 127. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
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particularity required to give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter under 
the PSLRA.128  Some courts permitted securities fraud plaintiffs to allege 
the requisite mental state simply by stating that it existed, while others 
required plaintiffs to allege with particularity facts giving rise to an 
inference of scienter.129
The Supreme Court framed its task as prescribing a “workable 
construction” of the “strong inference” standard, with an eye towards 
maintaining the twin goals of the PSLRA:  curbing “frivolous, lawyer-
driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on 
meritorious claims.”
 
130  The Court set out three prescriptions.  First, courts 
must, as in all motions to dismiss, accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true.131  Second, courts must consider the complaint in its 
entirety, as well as other sources traditionally examined in ruling on a 
motion to dismiss, such as documents incorporated into the complaint by 
reference and matters amenable to judicial notice.132  This inquiry is a 
holistic one:  the question is whether all the facts collectively give rise to a 
strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation does.133  
Finally, the inquiry has a comparative element; courts are required to “take 
into account plausible opposing inferences,” and deny the motion to dismiss 
only if the inference of scienter is “at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference.”134
While the surest route to scienter is to plead that the defendants 
possessed a pecuniary motive to commit fraud, the Court stated that the 
“absence of a motive allegation is not fatal.”
 
135  Indeed, the Court noted 
without expressly deciding that every circuit court that has considered the 
issue has held that a plaintiff may allege scienter by showing that the 
defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly.136  The Court held that to 
plead scienter adequately, the plaintiff must “plead facts rendering an 
inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing 
inference.”137  Meeting this standard has proven to be the major roadblock 
for plaintiffs in subprime securities suits to allow their 10b-5 claims to 
survive a motion to dismiss.138
A basic concept of particular import to pleading scienter successfully in 
the wake of financial collapse is the distinction between ex ante 
expectations and ex post losses.  The Tellabs Court cited with approval
 
139
 
 128. Id. at  319–20.  
 a 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 322. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 322–23. 
 134. See id. at 323–24. 
 135. Id. at 325. 
 136. See id. at 319–20 & n.3. 
 137. Id. at 328. 
 138. See infra Part II.B. 
 139. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320 (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 
1129 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
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1978 case, Denny v. Barber.140  Denny stands for the proposition that a 
plaintiff may not simply seize upon disclosures made in later reports and 
allege they should have been made sooner; this was termed “fraud by 
hindsight” by Judge Henry Friendly.141  The plaintiffs had alleged that 
Chase Manhattan Bank had engaged in fraud, evidenced by inadequate 
disclosure of risky loans that eventually resulted in significant losses.142  
The court held that failure to predict events that contributed to the 
realization of those losses, including a drastic increase in petroleum prices, 
did not constitute fraud.143  In the absence of allegations that the defendants 
perceived or were reckless in not perceiving these risks at the time they 
made their disclosures, plaintiffs did not adequately allege scienter.144  
Given the fact that the subprime mortgage meltdown and the ensuing credit 
crisis145 were not predicted by many sophisticated parties,146 it is not 
surprising that this distinction has featured prominently in many subprime 
securities suits.147
II.  DISPOSITIONS OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS IN 10B-5                               
SUBPRIME SECURITIES SUITS 
 
In this part, this Note surveys district court decisions involving 10b-5 
suits stemming from the subprime mortgage collapse and credit crisis.  
First, this part provides an overview of the securities class actions filed 
during and after the crisis, and proceeds to analyze the dispositions of 
thirty-four decisions on motions to dismiss in subprime securities suits.  In 
this sampling of cases, scienter was the most important factor in 
determining whether a complaint survives.  Finally, this part discusses 
factual and legal issues that influenced whether a plaintiff’s scienter 
allegations were held to be adequate. 
A.  Securities Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 
As the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 evolved into the global financial 
crisis of 2008, a wave of securities litigation followed.  At the end of 2007, 
thirty-seven financial crisis-related cases had been filed in federal court, 
 
 140. 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 141. Id. at 470. 
 142. See id. at 469. 
 143. See id. at 470. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See supra Part I.A. 
 146. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure & Competition (May 
17, 2007) (“[G]iven the fundamental factors in place that should support the demand for 
housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing 
market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime 
market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.”), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. 
 147. See infra Part III.A. 
290 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
thirty of which were filed in the last two quarters of that year.148  While this 
accounted for only 22 percent of the 163 federal securities class action 
lawsuits filed in 2007,149
2008 saw ninety-nine financial crisis related class action lawsuits filed, 
making up 47 percent of the 210 securities class actions registered in that 
year.
 that number would soon rise. 
150  The targets of these suits shifted from loan originators in 2007 to 
defendants involved in loan securitization in 2008, reflecting the spreading 
exposure of investment banks to the growing financial crisis.151  Indeed, 
while the number of loan originators named as defendants in 2008 (twenty-
two) remained steady compared to 2007 (nineteen), the percentage of 
financial crisis-related filings with loan originator defendants fell from 51 
percent in 2007 to just 22 percent in 2008.152
The rate of new federal securities class action filings tapered off 
somewhat in 2009 with 155 new cases.
 
153  This drop was most likely 
attributable to the decline in financial crisis-related cases from ninety-nine 
in 2008 to fifty-one in 2009, representing approximately 33 percent of the 
total class actions filed in 2009.154  One trend worth noting in 2009 was the 
length of time between the end of the class period and the filing date—at 
218 days, this was almost double the annual average of 114 days in the 
years between the passage of the PSLRA in 1995 and 2009, and 71 percent 
higher than the average of 127 days observed in 2008.155  This could 
suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys were refocusing on non-financial crisis 
matters.156  Indeed, as of the end of 2010, the storm of filings seems to have 
subsided.  Only nineteen financial crisis-related securities suits were filed, 
while the overall number of securities class action filings rose to 174.157
B.  Overview of Subprime Securities Decisions Surveyed:                      
 Methodology and Dispositions 
 
This section examines decisions on motions to dismiss in thirty-four 
securities class actions for losses stemming from the subprime mortgage 
 
 148. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 30 (2008), 
available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY
%20FINAL.PDF. 
 149. See id.; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 6 
(2009), available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-10-0559%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_
V7%20PRINT.PDF. 
 150. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra 
note 149, at 7. 
 151. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra 
note 148, at 34. 
 152. Id. at 31. 
 153. See 2009 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 149, at 6–7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2010 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 7–9 (2010), 
available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-11-0484%20SEC%20LIT%20STUDY_
V6BONLINE.PDF. 
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collapse and subsequent credit crisis.158  Of these thirty-four decisions, 
twenty denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 10b-5 claims 
at least in part.159  Eleven granted dismissal in full.160  Three dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claims, but allowed the plaintiffs’ other claims to 
proceed.161  Subsequent to the district court rulings, three dismissals have 
been affirmed by Circuit Courts of Appeals,162 and one case proceeded to 
trial, resulting in a jury verdict for the plaintiff.163
Given the importance of lending practices to the overall financial 
collapse,
 
164 it is perhaps not surprising that the most common allegation 
levied by plaintiffs was that the defendants misrepresented the strength of 
their underwriting standards for issuing mortgage loans or insuring financial 
products with exposure to subprime.  To use In re New Century165 as an 
example, a defendant might describe its underwriting standards to investors 
as “improved” or “strict.”166
 
 158. See Table I.  To identify these cases, this Note started with Kevin LaCroix’s 
extraordinarily useful list of dispositions in credit crisis-related lawsuits. Kevin M. LaCroix, 
The List:  Subprime Lawsuit Dismissals and Denials Decisions (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/subprimeresolution.doc.  As of July 16, 2011, 
LaCroix’s list consisted of seventy-nine grants and fifty-nine denials of motions to dismiss.  
This Note used the following methodology to narrow the list to thirty-four decisions.  First, 
multiple decisions in the same case and cases in which plaintiffs did not assert 10b-5 claims 
were removed.  Next, to focus on subprime securities suits, this Note omitted cases that were 
not putative class actions, claims for losses unrelated to subprime (such as auction rate 
securities and student loans), and decisions other than on the merits, for example dismissals 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  There are certainly many other useful ways to analyze 
this data, and the question of whether a particular case does or does not qualify as 
“subprime-related” was often a close one.  The goal of this Note is not to be exhaustive, but 
to analyze a representative sampling of decisions. 
  If the company’s loan underwriting standards 
 159. See Table I. 
 160. Id. 
 161. The other claims were under the ‘33 Act, which prohibits misleading statements 
made in connection with registration statements and prospectuses.  See In re Wachovia 
Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 366–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing 10b-5 claims 
but allowing ‘33 Act claims to proceed); In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & 
ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 762 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (same); Local 295/Local 851 
IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689 
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (same); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Because this Note 
focuses on the viability of 10b-5 claims at the motion to dismiss stage, these three decisions 
are considered dismissals for the remaining discussion. 
 162. In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10-12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May 24, 2011); Pittleman 
v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 
2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 
2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc., Sec. Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367 (W.D. 
Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 163. See Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2009 WL 3261941 
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); Nathan Koppel, Jury Finds Bankers Misled Loan Risk, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 19, 2010, at C3.  Trial verdicts in securities class actions are exceedingly rare:  since 
the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, 3,400 securities class actions have been filed in federal 
court but only twenty-eight have gone to trial. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 15. 
 164. See supra notes 34–49 and accompanying text. 
 165. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 166. See id. at 1225. 
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are actually lax, this may be an actionable misstatement.167  If the defendant 
is aware or should be aware that the standards are lax, he has made the 
misstatement with scienter.168  Twenty-three of the thirty-four decisions 
reviewed in this Note included allegations about underwriting standards:  in 
thirteen of these decisions, 10b-5 claims survived the motion to dismiss,169 
while in ten the 10b-5 claims did not.170  The plaintiffs in the remainder of 
the decisions alleged misrepresentations that included the scope of the 
defendant’s exposure to subprime either directly171
 
 167. See id.  In the cases examined, district courts have split on whether statements 
portraying underwriting practices as “strong” may be material misstatements actionable as 
securities fraud. Compare In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 
569, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding statements about company’s “conservative” underwriting 
approach to be “classic examples” of inactionable corporate puffery), with In re Ambac Fin. 
Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 271–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding statements 
about company’s “conservative” underwriting approach actionable, because once a 
defendant “affirmatively characterizes management practices as . . . ‘conservative,’” the 
subject is “in play” and the defendant is “bound to speak truthfully” (quoting Shapiro v. UJB 
Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1992))), and In re CIT Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 
Civ. 6613, 2010 WL 2365846 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010) (holding that touting 
“conservative” lending practices puts the subject “in play” (citing Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 
271)). 
 or indirectly through 
 168. See New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1229–30. 
 169. In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 240, 244–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(dismissing allegations related to mortgage underwriting but allowing claims related to CDO 
exposure to proceed); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 530–
32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re CIT, 2010 WL 2365846, at *2–3; Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. 
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 
2d 566, 586–87, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing underwriting allegations but allowing 
claims related to CDO exposure to continue); Ambac 693 F. Supp. 2d at 271; In re PMI Grp., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009); In re 
Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1206–07 (W.D. 
Wash. 2009); Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL 
3261941, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., 07-cv-03148, 
2008 WL 5378164, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008); New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1210; 
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145–47 (C.D. Cal. 2008); 
Atlas v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149–50 (S.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 170. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Local 
295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 
F. Supp. 2d 689, 706–07, 717 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (dismissing 10b-5 claims but allowing other 
claims to proceed); In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 
2010), aff’d sub nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10–12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May 24, 
2011); In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 580; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 07-CV-5756, 2010 WL 1473265, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010); 
Fulton Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., No. 08-C-0458, 2010 WL 601364, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 2010); In re Downey Sec. Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 2767670, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009); Pittleman v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-
0970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac 
Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878 
(8th Cir. 2009); Tripp v. Indymac Fin., Inc., No. CV 07-1635, 2007 WL 4591930, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007). 
 171. See, e.g., In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1204–05 
(D.N.M. 2010). 
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MBS and CDOs,172 adequacy of internal controls and risk management,173 
and in one case, a rating agency’s independence and methodology.174
These thirty-four decisions included defendants involved in all of the 
different stages of creating MBS and CDOs, from loan originators, to 
insurers of mortgages and financial products based on mortgages, to the 
broker-dealers and investment banks that traded in these products.
 
175  The 
type of defendant was not particularly predictive of the outcome of the 
motion to dismiss:  for example, loan originators, who were the defendants 
in seventeen of the thirty-four decisions, succeeded in dismissing the 10b-5 
claims against them in seven cases.176  The majority of the decisions came 
from district courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits, which accounted for 
thirteen and nine of the decisions surveyed by this Note, respectively.177  In 
this sampling, plaintiffs in the Second Circuit fared particularly well, 
surviving motions to dismiss in ten of thirteen cases.178
Rather, the question of whether or not the plaintiff adequately alleged 
scienter was dispositive in almost every case.  One early examination of 
securities class actions in the wake of the financial collapse indicated that 
scienter was a “perfect predictor” of the outcome of motions to dismiss 
subprime securities suits.
  The relatively 
small number of decisions discussed here, however, should caution against 
concluding that the Circuit in which the claim was brought was 
determinative of the outcome.   
179  This trend is apparent in the cases surveyed by 
this Note.  Only one decision that found a plaintiff’s scienter allegations 
sufficient went on to dismiss that case.180  The importance of scienter is 
further underscored by the three cases in which the 10b-5 claims were 
dismissed but ‘33 Act claims were permitted to proceed:  unlike 10b-5, 
actions under the ‘33 Act do not require scienter allegations.181
 
 172. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 
423 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 236–38; In re Regions Morgan Keegan 
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 759–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) 
(dismissing 10b-5 claims but allowing other claims to proceed); Plumbers & Steamfitters 
Local 773 Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting dismissal); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 629 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying dismissal); In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 
F. Supp. 2d 951 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (granting dismissal); In re Moneygram Int’l, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 947 (D. Minn. 2009) (denying dismissal). 
 
 173. See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 174. In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 175. See Table I. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Jonathan Eisenberg, Subprime Securities Class Action Decisions:  Who’s Winning, 
Who’s Losing and Why?, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. CLASS ACTIONS, no. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications1962_0.pdf. 
 180. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 598–602 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding misstatements made with scienter actionable but dismissing for 
failure to plead loss causation). 
 181. See In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 366–78 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 
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Because properly alleging scienter has proved the biggest hurdle for 
plaintiffs in surviving motions to dismiss, an inquiry into the types of 
allegations that have been held to provide the required “strong inference” of 
scienter and those that have been held insufficient is warranted.  The reader 
should bear in mind in the following discussion, however, that under 
Tellabs a district court must “consider the complaint in its entirety” in 
determining whether a strong inference of scienter is pleaded.182
1.  Confidential Witnesses 
  Thus no 
one type of fact or conduct alleged is by itself dispositive of scienter; rather, 
it is the combination of the totality of the allegations and circumstances that 
determines the outcome. 
Plaintiffs in subprime securities suits have relied to a great extent on the 
testimony of confidential witnesses.  Of the thirty-four decisions surveyed, 
all but three utilized confidential witnesses to support the plaintiff’s scienter 
allegations.183  The only suit that did not use confidential witnesses and 
survived motion practice was In re Moody’s Corporation Securities 
Litigation.184  There the plaintiffs had the luxury of relying upon transcripts 
from congressional hearings that included internal documents indicating 
that Moody’s executives were aware of problems in the independence of 
their ratings.185  In fact, in dismissing the complaint in Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce,186 the district court specifically noted the absence of 
confidential sources.187
With thirty-one of thirty-four decisions involving confidential witnesses, 
it is clear that they play a crucial role in subprime securities suits.  With 
10b-5 claims in twelve of these cases nevertheless dismissed, it is also clear 
that confidential witness statements do not ensure that a complaint will 
survive.  Where the confidential witness statements failed to show what the 
defendants knew or how the confidential witnesses knew what the 
defendants knew, the courts dismissed the fraud claims.  For example, in 
New York State Teachers’ Retirement Systems v. Fremont General 
Corp.,
 
188
 
759–62 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare 
Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689, 704 (S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 the statements of forty-two confidential witnesses concerning 
exceptions to underwriting standards were found insufficient to allege 
 182. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).  For a 
discussion of Tellabs, see supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text. 
 183. The three that did not mention confidential witnesses in the opinion or complaint 
are:  In re Regions Morgan Keegan, 743 F. Supp. 2d 744 (dismissing 10b-5 claims but 
allowing Section 11 claims to proceed); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. 
Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting motion to 
dismiss); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying 
motion to dismiss). 
 184. 599 F. Supp. 2d 493. 
 185. See id. at 504, 515–17. 
 186. 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 187. See id. at 299. 
 188. 07-cv-5756, 2009 WL 3112574 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009). 
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scienter, because “the allegations do not establish that any of the 
confidential witnesses were in a position to gain personal knowledge of 
what Defendants saw, knew, or thought.”189  Similarly, the In re Wachovia 
Equity Securities Litigation190 court rejected evidence from confidential 
witnesses where there was “no allegation that any [confidential witness] 
met the Individual Defendants, reported any concerns, received any 
instructions, or made any personal contact with them during the Class 
Period.”191
Where plaintiffs describe confidential witnesses’ positions in the 
company with particularity, however, their statements detailing knowledge 
of facts inconsistent with the company’s public statements may show 
scienter.  The success of the plaintiffs in Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, 
Inc.
 
192 on their second complaint is one example—where initially the court 
rejected the confidential witness statements because of a lack of “specific 
information as to the confidential witnesses’ positions in the Company, 
their employment duties, the foundation or basis for their knowledge,”193 
the court later concluded that the amended complaint fixed these 
deficiencies.194  In re PMI Group, Inc. Securities Litigation195 provides a 
similar example:  initially, the court found inadequate a confidential witness 
statement that he prepared reports describing non-performing assets that 
PMI continued to insure, because the complaint did not describe the reports 
in detail, and also rejected a statement that PMI’s exposure to bad loans was 
“widely recognized,” because the complaint did not explain how the 
witness would know what was “widely recognized” at the company.196  The 
court later held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged scienter in their 
amended complaint, where the confidential witness statements described 
the reports with more specificity, and new confidential witness statements 
specifically described the defendants’ awareness of these reports.197
The reliance of plaintiffs on confidential witness statements comes in the 
midst of some uncertainty over what weight the statements of confidential 
sources should be afforded after Tellabs.  Subsequent to Tellabs, the 
Seventh Circuit held that allegations from confidential witnesses must be 
discounted, because “[i]t is hard to see how information from anonymous 
sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of 
 
 
 189. Id. at *11. 
 190. 753 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 191. Id. at 352. 
 192. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 193. Id. at 1284. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 179. 
 194. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL 3261941, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009) (“In contrast, the Amended Complaint contains sufficient 
information regarding these confidential witnesses, including their employment duties, 
whether they were employed during the Class Period and how they obtained direct 
knowledge of the facts they were reporting.”).  The plaintiffs later won a jury verdict in their 
favor at trial. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 195. No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 1916934 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (PMI I). 
 196. See id. at *8–9. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 179. 
 197. In re PMI Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 2, 2009). 
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plausible opposing inferences.  Perhaps these confidential sources have 
axes to grind.  Perhaps they are lying.  Perhaps they don’t even exist.”198  
The Fifth Circuit has agreed,199 while the Third200 and the Eleventh201 
Circuits have issued opinions holding that anonymity itself does not 
undermine confidential witness statements so long as the basis of the 
source’s knowledge is described with particularity.  In the opinions 
surveyed by this Note, two district courts in the Southern District of New 
York202 and one in the District of New Mexico203
2.  Position-Based Inferences 
 expressly noted this 
disagreement; absent guidance from their respective circuits to the contrary, 
each weighed whether sufficient detail was provided about the confidential 
source’s basis of knowledge.  The other opinions surveyed did not directly 
consider this burgeoning “split” in the circuits. 
In twenty-seven of the thirty-four decisions examined in this Note—
fifteen denials204 and twelve grants205
 
 198. Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 of motions to dismiss—plaintiffs 
 199. See Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 
535 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Following Tellabs, courts must discount allegations from confidential 
sources. Such sources afford no basis for drawing the plausible competing inferences 
required by Tellabs.”) (citations omitted). 
 200. See Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 201. See Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 202. See In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566, 590 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 267 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 203. See In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 n.11 
(D.N.M. 2010). 
 204. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 
CV:  10-2847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *27–30 (N.D. Ala. June 7, 2011); In re 
Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 236–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Freudenberg v. 
E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re MBIA, 700 F. Supp. 2d 
at 588; Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69; Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 
629, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Thornburg, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1210–11; In re PMI Grp., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009); In re 
Wash. Mut., Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1209–20 (W.D. 
Wash. 2009); Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 WL 
3261941, at *1–3 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009); In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., 07-CV-03148, 
2008 WL 5378164, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008); In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 
1206, 1229–31 (C.D. Cal. 2008); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 
1132, 1189–96 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Atlas v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 556 
F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156–57 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
 205. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 757–
58 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare Fund 
v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689, 725–27 (S.D. Ohio 2010); In re Radian Sec. 
Litig., No. 07-3375, 2010 WL 1767195, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2010); In re Sec. Capital 
Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Plumbers & 
Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 
287, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 
2d 951, 970–71 (S.D. Ohio 2009); N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 
07-cv-5756, 2009 WL 3112574, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009); In re Downey Sec. 
Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 2767670, at *9–11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009); Pittleman 
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sought to support their scienter allegations by attempting to attribute 
knowledge to senior officers at least in part by their positions in the 
corporation.  Construed broadly, “position-based inferences” might include 
a plaintiff’s attempts to attribute knowledge of, or recklessness to, false and 
misleading misstatements by pointing to the defendant’s high rank, 
membership on committees, receipt of internal reports, or allegations of 
widespread internal knowledge at the corporation of which the defendants 
could not possibly be unaware. 
One should not, however, simply look at the above tally of wins and 
losses and conclude that position-based inferences are a path to success for 
plaintiffs in surviving a motion to dismiss.  On the contrary, those courts 
concluding that a plaintiff’s scienter allegations rested solely on the high 
rank of the defendants did not hesitate to dismiss the complaint.206  
Similarly, mere attendance at meetings, even where adverse financial 
results were discussed, is insufficient.207  Instead, the cases reveal that 
plaintiffs generally do not allege a strong inference of scienter by merely 
alleging that defendants had access to information because of their high 
rank; a more particularized showing of what information the defendants 
possessed is required.  As one district court observed in dismissing the 10b-
5 claims against Fifth Third Bancorp, “[t]here are no factual allegations, 
however, that Defendants actually read or reviewed information 
available . . . .  Since the complaint relies entirely on Defendants’ mere 
access to financial data, these allegations fail to support a strong inference 
of scienter.”208
A good example of this requirement can be found in Hubbard v. 
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.
 
209  Initially, the court granted the motion to 
dismiss, finding that allegations that defendants regularly received reports 
on exceptions to underwriting guidelines did not indicate “what these 
Defendants knew or should have known about the Company’s lending 
practices . . . because there is no information about what the Exception 
Reports actually contained during that time.”210  The fact that the 
defendants sat on a major loan committee “may demonstrate negligence as 
to their monitoring of the Company’s lending practices,” but did not rise to 
the showing of recklessness required to demonstrate scienter.211
 
v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 
(9th Cir. 2010); In re 2007 Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367, 
at *4 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Tripp v. Indymac Fin., 
Inc., No. CV 07-1635, 2007 WL 4591930, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007). 
 
 206. See Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 725–27; In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 
729 F. Supp. 2d at 595; Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 299; In re 
Huntington Bancshares, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 971; Fremont Gen. Corp., 2009 WL 3112574, at 
*14; In re Radian Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2009); In re Downey Sec. 
Litig., No. CV 08-3261, 2009 WL 736802, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009). 
 207. See, e.g., In re Novastar, 07-0139-CV, 2008 WL 2354367, at *4. 
 208. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 726. 
 209. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (BankAtlantic I). 
 210. Id.; see supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 211. BankAtlantic I, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
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The plaintiff’s amended complaint, however, survived the defendant’s 
renewed motion to dismiss.212  Where previously the plaintiff relied upon 
the defendants’ high rank to infer their knowledge of risky loans, the 
amended complaint used confidential witnesses to put forth particularized 
allegations of the duties and responsibilities of the defendants at the 
company.213  For example, instead of alleging that the Chief Financial 
Officer “must have known” of the company’s inadequate loan loss reserves, 
the amended complaint alleged that the CFO was “responsible for 
determining, reviewing and monitoring loan loss reserves.”214  The 
amended complaint also contained particularized facts about the 
information contained in the exception reports, and specifically described 
meetings attended by the defendants at which these reports were circulated 
as agenda items.215
As with the use of confidential witnesses,
 
216 resolution of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments centering on the defendants’ positions at the company at the 
district court level touches upon an issue of some disagreement between the 
circuits.  An alternative route for pleading scienter is the “core operations 
inference.”  In a nutshell, the “core operations inference” means “that 
knowledge of core activities of a business may be imputed to its highest 
officials in some circumstances.”217  The Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits have expressed willingness to consider the core operations 
inference.218  Other circuits have not directly considered arguments related 
to a company’s core business, but decisions from the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits declining to impute knowledge to management based on the 
magnitude or nature of the alleged fraud indicate that these circuits might be 
reluctant to accept it.219
 
 212. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. (BankAtlantic II), No. 07-61542-Civ, 2009 
WL 3261941, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2009). 
   
 213. See id. at *3; see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 214. Id. at *3 n.6. 
 215. See id. at *1–2 & n.4. 
 216. See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. 
 217. In re RAIT Fin. Trust Sec. Litig., No. 2:07-CV-03148, 2008 WL 5378164, at *12 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008) (emphasis omitted); see also Bruce D. Angiolillo, Establishing 
Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions Through Imputation of Knowledge, in 42ND ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 325, 329 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course 
Handbook Ser., No. 24008, 2010), available at Westlaw, 1850 PLI/Corp 325; Gregory A. 
Markel & Martin L. Seidel, ‘Core Operations’ Doctrine May Undermine PSLRA, N.Y. L.J., 
Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/042910
MarkelSeidelNYLJ.pdf. 
 218. See Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 269 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(considering the core operations inference as part of the totality of circumstances indicative 
of scienter); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that scienter may be inferred from an officer’s position alone when the falsity of the 
information is “patently obvious—where the facts [are] prominent enough that it would be 
absurd to suggest that top management was unaware of them”) (internal quotations omitted); 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008) (imputing 
knowledge of the lack of demand for the company’s two most important products to its top 
senior management). 
 219. See Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 929 (8th Cir. 2008) (declining to rule whether 
the core operations inference is viable, but rejecting plaintiffs’ scienter allegations for failing 
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Nine of the district court decisions surveyed by this Note explicitly 
discussed the “core operations inference,” with five denying220 and four 
granting221 the motions to dismiss.  Unsurprisingly, all but three of these 
decisions have come from the Third or Ninth Circuits, which have 
expressly endorsed the core operations inference subsequent to Tellabs.  
The decisions suggest, however, a reluctance to find scienter based solely 
on the core operations inference.  Indeed, in PMI I, the original complaint 
was dismissed when it attempted to rely on the core operations inference; it 
was only upon repleading, with further factual allegations from confidential 
witnesses, that plaintiffs were able to survive the 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.222  Similarly, in Pittleman v. Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.,223 
the court held that the plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to give 
rise to the “exceedingly rare” circumstance that would permit an inference 
of scienter solely from the fact that the alleged misstatements involved the 
defendant’s core business.224  In two other dismissals, In re Huntington 
Bancshares, Inc. Securities Litigation225 and In re Radian Securities 
Litigation,226 the courts both held that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations 
were insufficient, and that the business activities in question were not 
actually “core operations” of the defendants.227
Moreover, even in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities 
Litigation,
 
228
 
to allege sufficient facts indicating knowledge at the company); Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension 
Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp. Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535–36, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(reversing district court’s denial of motion to dismiss and declining to impute knowledge to 
management based on “massive” size of accounting irregularities and defendants’ “hands-
on” management style). 
 the decision that relied most heavily on the core operations 
inference to deny dismissal, the court emphasized that “position alone 
 220. Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
PMI I, No. C08-1405, 2009 WL 1916934, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009); In re RAIT, 07-
CV-03148, 2008 WL 5378164, at *12; In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1227–29 
(C.D. Cal. 2008); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1189–90 
(C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 221. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
In re Huntington Bancshares, Inc. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 2d 951, 970, 975–76 (S.D. Ohio 
2009); In re Radian Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Pittleman v. 
Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 07-0970, 2009 WL 648983, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
9, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 222. See PMI I, 2009 WL 1916934, at *9–10; In re PMI Grp., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C08-
1405, 2009 WL 3681669, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009). 
 223. 2009 WL 648983. 
 224. Id. at *3. 
 225. 674 F. Supp. 2d 951. 
 226. 612 F. Supp. 2d 594. 
 227. Id. at 617–18 (holding that the complaint only established “that Radian’s financial 
services segment as a whole [as opposed to the subsidiary whose operations were at issue] 
constituted 28% of Radian’s net income in 2006, and 11% of its equity”) (emphasis 
omitted); Huntington Bancshares, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (noting that the operations at issue 
accounted for “just 3.9 percent of Huntington’s total loans and leases and just 2.8 percent of 
Huntington’s total assets, hardly bringing it into the territory of Huntington’s core 
operations”). 
 228. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
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creates a strong inference of scienter only in the extraordinary case where it 
is ‘absurd to suggest’ that a defendant did not know.”229  The scienter 
allegations in that case were supported with confidential witnesses, who 
described underwriting problems at Countrywide of such breadth that if 
“the highly particularized allegations about Countrywide’s core business 
operations give even a rough sketch” of Countrywide’s business practices, 
many of the defendants’ statements about those practices may well have 
been fraudulent.230  Similarly, though the In re RAIT Financial Trust 
Securities Litigation231 court found that the alleged misstatements about 
RAIT’s underwriting standards had to do with the company’s core business 
operations, it was also influenced by corroborating testimony of 
confidential witnesses indicating that the defendants had ample reason to 
know of the falsity of their statements.232
Two decisions included in this survey from the Southern District of New 
York are of particular note, as the Second Circuit has not endorsed the core 
operations inference subsequent to the passage of the PSLRA in 1995.
 
233  
The In re Wachovia Equity Securities Litigation234 court noted that the 
seminal core operations decision from the Second Circuit predated the 
PSLRA by six years.235  After examining recent decisions in the district and 
concluding that those courts varied on the issue, the court “venture[d] to 
suggest that the future of the doctrine may be tenuous” and held that it 
would consider “‘core operations’ allegations to constitute supplementary 
but not independently sufficient means to plead scienter.”236  Meanwhile, 
the court in Freudenberg v. E*Trade Financial Corp.237 accepted the core 
operations inference.238  Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Makor and 
two pre-Tellabs decisions from the Southern District of New York, the 
E*Trade court found that the magnitude of E*Trade’s mortgage business 
(and subsequent write-offs thereof) relative to its overall business 
operations made the inference of scienter compelling for misstatements 
about its underwriting practices.239  The scienter allegations in E*Trade 
were buttressed, however, by sixteen confidential witnesses pointing to 
specific meetings and reports, serious accounting violations, and indications 
of insider trading.240  Thus the E*Trade decision may be unusual only 
insofar as it explicitly applied the core operations label; for example, in 
another Southern District of New York case surveyed for this Note, In re 
MBIA, Inc. Securities Litigation,241
 
 229. Id. at 1191. 
 the district court cited as evidence of 
 230. Id. at 1192. 
 231. 07-cv-03148, 2008 WL 5378164 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008). 
 232. Id. at *13–14. 
 233. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 234. 753 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 235. Id. at 352–53 (citing Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 236. Id. 
 237. 712 F. Supp. 2d 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 238. Id. at 199. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. at 196–201. 
 241. 700 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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scienter the importance of MBIA’s credit rating to its business, and the 
importance of residential MBS (RMBS) to maintaining that credit rating.242
III.  A FINANCIAL CRISIS DEFENSE? 
 
This part examines the ways in which the financial crisis itself has played 
a role in the dispositions of motions to dismiss.  First, it discusses the role 
the crisis has played in pleading scienter.  Second, this part discusses the 
effect of the crisis on pleading loss causation. 
A.  Scienter 
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court held that a court should weigh the 
inference of fraud against alternative “cogent and compelling” explanations 
when determining whether a complaint adequately alleges scienter.243  A 
court may also consider matters amenable to judicial notice.244  It is 
therefore not surprising that many defendants have sought to attribute 
shareholder losses to the financial crisis, accusing plaintiffs of pleading 
fraud by hindsight.245  At the same time, plaintiffs have attempted to use 
the crisis offensively, alleging that the defendant’s knowledge of the 
growing crisis rendered their public statements fraudulent.  Indeed, in 
affirming the dismissal of claims against Impac Mortgage Holdings, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that both parties agreed that the court should take 
judicial notice of the financial crisis, but for opposite purposes.246
1.  Grants of Motions to Dismiss 
 
In Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 773 Pension Fund v. Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce,247 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
misled investors about their exposure to the growing subprime mortgage 
crisis.248  Both parties attempted to use the financial crisis to aid them in the 
motion to dismiss:  plaintiffs argued that the defendants “knew or should 
have known of the deteriorating market situation.”249  The defendants, 
meanwhile, referenced twenty-one exhibits, internet sources, and news 
articles about the financial crisis in their motion to dismiss.250
 
 242. Id. at 593 & n.19 (citing In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–75, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying core operations inference)). 
  Although 
 243. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 (2007); 
supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322. 
 245. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Sharenow v. Impac Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App’x 714, 716 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2010).  The court declined to resolve the issue of whether it should take judicial notice of the 
financial crisis or its causes, as it held that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged scienter 
regardless of the economic downturn. Id. 
 247. 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 248. See id. at 292. 
 249. See id. at 296. 
 250. See id. at 297 n.2; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint at 1–4, Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 773 
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the court declined to consider the defendants’ exhibits “except to the limited 
extent that they inform the competing inference analysis required by 
[Tellabs],” it took judicial notice of the financial crisis.251  The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, holding that even if the defendants had 
notice of the crisis, “knowledge of a general economic trend does not 
equate to harboring a mental state to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”252  
Under the Tellabs comparative inquiry, the inference of fraudulent intent 
was less compelling than the inference that the bank chose an incremental 
response in the face of “an unprecedented paralysis of the credit market and 
a global recession.”253
Defendants in other cases have had success using the financial crisis as a 
defense to scienter.  In re Radian Securities Litigation
 
254 is one example.  
There, plaintiffs alleged that defendants downplayed liquidity problems at a 
subsidiary that securitized subprime mortgages, misleading investors who 
were harmed when the revelation of the truth caused the share price to 
fall.255  To support their scienter allegations, plaintiffs argued, among other 
things, that the adverse trends in the subprime industry should have put the 
defendants on notice that their statements would mislead investors.256  The 
court rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiffs’ allegations 
concerning the general state of the subprime industry did not constitute 
evidence that the defendants must have known that their actions posed a 
risk of misleading investors.257  The court went further, suggesting that 
scienter is more difficult to demonstrate in the wake of the financial crisis.  
It cited the Second Circuit’s “marketwide phenomenon” language from 
First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. in stating that “attempts to 
hold defendants responsible for market forces out of their control—and 
outside of their realm of prediction—cannot succeed.”258
2.  Denials of Motions to Dismiss 
 
Some courts have accepted plaintiffs’ arguments that the knowledge of 
the financial crisis itself should be indicative of scienter.  One particularly 
noteworthy example is the In re Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. Securities 
Litigation259
 
Pension Fund v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 08 CV 8143), 2009 WL 2043588. 
 decision denying dismissal of 10b-5 claims against 
 251. See Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 297 n.2. 
 252. Id. at 300.  This language was subsequently cited in In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 253.  Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 301; see also In re Wachovia 
Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The more compelling 
inference . . . is that Defendants simply did not anticipate the full extent of the mortgage 
crisis. . . .  Although a colossal blunder with grave consequences for many, such a failure is 
simply not enough to support a claim for securities fraud.”). 
 254. 612 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Radian I). 
 255. Id. at 606. 
 256. See id. at 617. 
 257. Id. at 619. 
 258. See id. at 620 n.25; see also supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
 259. 695 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.N.M. 2010). 
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Thornburg’s President and Chief Operating Officer.260  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants tried to conceal the company’s financial woes 
from investors; the defendants, meanwhile, argued that the losses were 
caused by market forces beyond the control or prediction of the company’s 
leadership.261  In rejecting the defendants’ arguments that insider purchases 
of Thornburg’s stock by insiders during the class period undermined the 
inference of scienter, the court held that a desire to survive the mortgage 
meltdown might provide a motive for the defendants to make misleading 
statements.262  This motivation alone was not enough to allege scienter—
also important was confidential witness testimony that the President was so 
“deeply involved” in Thornburg’s operations that he knew of Thornburg’s 
exposure263—but the crisis itself was a factor contributing to the “mounting 
image of [Thornburg] as a company trying to shield its weakening 
infrastructure from the prying eyes of its investors.”264
Two other cases, In re MoneyGram International, Inc. Securities 
Litigation
 
265 and In re Citigroup, Inc. Securities Litigation,266 indicate that 
courts are more likely to accept allegations that defendants had knowledge 
of the brewing financial collapse when they are coupled with allegations of 
questionable internal practices.  In MoneyGram, the plaintiffs cited external 
market indicators—including the decline in the market for MBS and ABSs, 
rating agency downgrades, and bankruptcies of subprime lenders—as 
evidence that the defendants should have been aware that their statements 
about the risks of the company’s subprime portfolio were misleading.267  
As in Thornburg, these financial crisis allegations alone were not enough, 
but combined with suspicious violations of internal controls by 
MoneyGram, particularly in keeping its accounting ledger open throughout 
the class period, the court was persuaded that the plaintiff’s narrative of 
scienter was at least as compelling as the defendants’ competing narrative 
of unforeseeable market collapse.268  Similarly, in Citigroup, the court was 
persuaded by the plaintiff’s allegations that Citigroup took significant 
internal steps to mitigate the risks of its CDO portfolio while publicly 
proclaiming the portfolio’s soundness.269
 
 260. Id. at 1225. 
 
 261. See id. at 1192. 
 262. See id. at 1194.  The court stated: 
The economy in 2007 and early 2008 was a ferocious beast that devoured many 
mortgage lending companies. . . .  [The Court could infer that] especially during 
the mortgage crisis period, the Thornburg Defendants—many of whom were 
already holders of a substantial interest in TMI and whose careers were intertwined 
with it—sought to infuse TMI with more cash in hopes of increasing public 
confidence and giving TMI the capital it needed to ride out the crisis.  
Id. 
 263. Id. at 1211. 
 264. Id. 
 265. 626 F. Supp. 2d 947 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 266. 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 267. See Moneygram, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 981–82. 
 268. See id. at 974, 982–83. 
 269. See Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 237–38. 
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Some courts have also rejected efforts to use the financial crisis 
defensively.  In In re Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Securities Litigation,270 
the court rejected the defendants’ arguments that “[i]n light of the broader 
financial picture . . . the more compelling inference is that Ambac’s officers 
could not predict the economic collapse and consequently the company’s 
modeling tools failed to value accurately the risk of loss underlying its 
CDO portfolio.”271  While the defendants presented one inference that 
could be drawn from the facts alleged, the court also considered the 
plaintiff’s narrative, which portrayed a “vast gap” between the way Ambac 
publicly portrayed itself as a company that had retained its conservative 
underwriting standards, and its undisclosed lowering of those standards.272  
The court went so far as to state that Ambac’s arguments were “premised 
on a convenient confusion of cause and effect.  The conduct that plaintiffs 
allege, if true, would make Ambac an active participant in the collapse of 
their own business, and of the financial markets in general, rather than 
merely a passive victim.”273  This language was subsequently cited in 
rejecting similar arguments for dismissal in the suit brought against Bear 
Stearns.274
B.  Loss Causation 
 
Scienter has been the major hurdle for plaintiffs in financial crisis-related 
suits under section 10b and Rule 10b-5:  in the cases examined, only one 
court that found the plaintiff’s scienter allegations sufficient ultimately 
dismissed the complaint for failure to plead loss causation.275  This dearth 
of dispositions on loss causation grounds is not for a lack of effort on the 
part of defendants.  Defendants in sixteen of the decisions surveyed cited 
the “marketwide phenomenon” language276 from Gelt and Lentell in their 
motion to challenge plaintiffs’ loss causation allegations in light of the 
financial crisis.277
 
 270. 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
  In ten decisions, these arguments were rejected and the 
 271. Id. at 269. 
 272. See id. 
 273. Id. at 270.  Similar language can be found in other decisions denying motions to 
dismiss. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“The ‘current financial crisis’ is not necessarily an absolute defense if it is alleged 
that defendants have misled the public as to the quality of their holdings.”). 
 274. See In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 
504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 275. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text for discussion of this passage. 
 277. See In re Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 506–08; Radian I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 
619 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 24, Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s 
Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761 (N.D. Ala. June 7, 2011) 
(CV:  10-2847), 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 2167; Consolidated Memorandum of 
Law in Support of the Wachovia Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Amended 
Consolidated Class Action Complaints at 81–82, In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Nos. 08 Civ. 6171, 09 Civ. 6351), 2010 WL 4020397; 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated 
Amended Complaint at 67, In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 
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motion to dismiss denied.278  In four decisions, the 10b-5 claims were 
dismissed on scienter grounds and the court did not reach the question of 
loss causation.279  The argument was only adopted by the district court in 
two cases, In re Security Capital Assurance, Ltd. Securities Litigation280 
and In re Homebanc Securities Litigation.281  In Homebanc, the court also 
found the shortcomings of the plaintiff’s scienter arguments to be an 
independent ground for dismissal.282
 
2010) (No. 07 Civ. 9901), 2009 WL 773441; Memorandum of Law in Support of Fannie 
Mae’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 41, In re 
Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (08 Civ. 7831), 2009 WL 
5251511; Defendant American International Group, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Its Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 72, In re Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (08 Civ. 4772), 2009 WL 
2446763; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint 
with Memorandum in Support at 87, Local 295/Local 851 IBT Emp’r Grp. Pension Trust & 
Welfare Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (No. 1:08-CV-
421), 2009 WL 2869446; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss at 39, Freudenberg, 712 F. Supp. 2d 171 (No. 07 Civ. 8538), 2009 WL 1635591; 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion by Defendants Patrick S. Flood & Kevin D. 
Race to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 31, In re HomeBanc 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 1:08-CV-1461), 2009 WL 
5109723, aff’d sub nom. Kadel v. Flood, No. 10–12220, 2011 WL 2015379 (11th Cir. May 
24, 2011); Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 43, In re MBIA, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-CV-264), 2009 WL 1635641; XL 
Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint at 19, In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 
569 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 11086), 2010 WL 4898813; Memorandum in Support of 
Ambac & Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class 
Action Complaint at 31, Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d 241 (No. 08 Civ. 411), 2008 WL 5372693; 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated 
Amended Complaint at 20, In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (No. 07 CV. 8375), 2008 WL 5372580; Countrywide Defendants’ Notice of Motion & 
Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the 
Federal Securities Laws at 53 n.25, In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 
1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. CV-07-05295), 2008 WL 2725371; Defendants’ Suggestions in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 37, In re 2007 
Novastar Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 2354367 (W.D. Mo. June 4, 2008) (07-0139-CV), 
2007 WL 4688210. 
  Thus Security Capital Assurance is 
the only case surveyed by this Note in which loss causation was the 
dispositive issue. 
 278. See Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *31–34; In re Bear 
Stearns, 763 F. Supp 2d at 506–08; Citigroup, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 236; Am. Int’l Grp., 741 
F. Supp. 2d at 534; Fannie Mae, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 414; E*trade, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 202; 
MBIA, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 596 & n.22; Ambac, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74; Moody’s, 599 
F. Supp. 2d at 513–14; Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
 279. In re Wachovia, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 367; Fifth Third Bancorp, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 
717; Radian I, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 608; Novastar, 2008 WL 2354367, at *4. 
 280. 729 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 281. In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 599; HomeBanc, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 
1360–61. 
 282. HomeBanc, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. 
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1.  Grants of Motions to Dismiss 
Security Capital Assurance, Ltd. (SCA) was a financial guaranty insurer, 
a company that promises to pay the holder of a security in the event that an 
issuer defaults.  The plaintiffs, led by the Employees’ Retirement System of 
the State of Rhode Island, alleged that SCA made false and misleading 
statements about its ABS and CDO exposure as well as about its monitoring 
of this exposure, which caused the plaintiffs to suffer loss when the truth 
was revealed.283
The claims that survived the court’s scienter inquiry were dismissed for 
failure to plead loss causation adequately.
 
284  The plaintiffs did not allege 
that a single announcement of previously undisclosed information caused a 
sharp drop in SCA’s share price; rather, they alleged a “slow, steady 
decline” in the value of SCA’s stock resulting from the “gradual revelation 
of the truth” of SCA’s exposure to the subprime crisis.285
The district court traced SCA’s stock price throughout the class 
period.
 
286  At the outset, the court noted that “though Plaintiffs are not 
expected to conduct an event study on a Motion to Dismiss, event study 
methodology is instructive here” and that the plaintiffs’ wide event window 
“made it difficult to isolate the impact of Defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations” from other market events.287
Throughout its discussion of the stock price during the class period, the 
court noted the plaintiffs’ failure to address and exclude possible 
intervening causes of drops in share prices or to explain rises in the stock 
price at certain points.
 
288  For example, the court noted that in November 
2007 the rating agency Fitch announced downgrades of a large number of 
CDO tranches, including the three insured by SCA, and that the plaintiffs 
had not alleged facts suggesting that the decline in SCA’s stock value was 
caused by the defendants’ misrepresentations, rather than Fitch’s 
downgrades.289
 
 283. See id. at 574–78. 
  The court held that the plaintiffs had not “effectively 
shown that it was the incremental revelation of Defendants’ fraudulent 
misrepresentations, and not the actions of third parties or other 
circumstances of the market, that caused the decline in SCA’s share price 
 284. See id. at 602. 
 285. See id. at 599. 
 286. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 599–602.  The court began by 
quoting the marketwide phenomenon language from Lentell. See supra notes 120–26 and 
accompanying text. 
 287. See id. at 600 & n.5.  An event study is a statistical technique that attempts to 
separate the effects of firm-specific information and information that is likely to affect stock 
prices market-wide.  The first step is to select an event window, the period when the firm-
specific information becomes available to the market and may affect the price.  The longer 
the event window, the more likely it includes all new information about the event, but longer 
event windows also make it difficult to isolate the impact of the event from other 
information that might affect the stock price. See Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The 
Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases:  Applications at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 556–58 (1994). 
 288. See In re Sec. Capital Assurance, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 600–01. 
 289. See id. at 601. 
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over the Class Period.”290  Indeed, the district court found that the events of 
the financial crisis so overwhelmed the Plaintiff’s loss causation allegations 
that in granting leave to replead, it stated that it was unlikely that the 
plaintiffs would be able to attribute their losses to specific 
misrepresentations by individuals at SCA, only one of hundreds of 
companies brought down by RMBS and CDOs.291
The court in HomeBanc did not engage in nearly so searching an 
analysis.  There, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that the 
information allegedly concealed from investors was revealed, subsequently 
causing a stock drop.
 
292  The plaintiffs’ speculation that the drop in 
HomeBanc’s stock “must have been caused by fraudulent conduct” was 
unpersuasive in light of the stock’s steady decline throughout the class 
period, similar to the declines of HomeBanc’s competitors.293  While the 
court noted that causation issues are usually not resolved at the motion to 
dismiss stage, the plaintiffs had failed to make any allegation allowing the 
court to distinguish losses caused by the defendants’ misrepresentation and 
the general market downturn.294
2.  Denials of Motions to Dismiss 
 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the decisions that rejected the 
defendants’ arguments that the financial crisis was an intervening cause is 
the brevity of the analysis employed in many of them.  In Citigroup, for 
example, the loss causation analysis occupied just four sentences of the 
forty-five page decision.295  This is perhaps less surprising in those cases, 
like Citigroup, where the plaintiff was able to identify corrective 
disclosures closely correlated with drops in share price.296
 
 290. Id. at 602. 
   
 291. See id. at 603. 
 292. In re HomeBanc Corp. Sec. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005)).  
 295. See In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The 
court stated: 
Further, [plaintiffs] have adequately pled loss causation.  Plaintiffs have identified 
several corrective disclosures that allegedly demonstrated the falsity of defendants’ 
previous statements, and plaintiffs have also alleged that the value of their 
securities declined following the corrective disclosures.  Plaintiffs’ allegations are 
sufficient at this early stage of the litigation.  Whether the alleged omissions and 
false statements actually caused plaintiffs’ losses cannot be determined at this 
stage of the litigation.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 296. See id.; see also Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery and Food Emp.’s Welfare Fund v. 
Regions Fin. Corp., CV:  10-2847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60761, at *31–33 (N.D. Ala. June 
7, 2011); In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 508 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 534 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 273–74 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
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Yet even in cases where the plaintiff alleged a series of partial 
disclosures297 or a materialization of the concealed risk,298 the defendants’ 
arguments often proved unpersuasive, and the court reserved the question of 
intervening causation for a later stage in the litigation.299  For example, in 
Countrywide, defendants argued that the complaint did not sufficiently 
identify corrective disclosures, or distinguish the effect of the alleged 
misrepresentations from the decline in the market in general and among 
mortgage lenders in particular.300  The defendants noted that share prices of 
Countrywide’s competitors also dropped precipitously during the same 
period.301  The court was not swayed by the fact that the alleged corrective 
disclosures were piecemeal, holding that “loss causation is not precluded by 
a series of disclosures; serial disclosures just make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs as a practical matter.”302  The court noted that “the price of 
Countrywide securities dropped as the disclosures accumulated,” with many 
drops in share price tightly correlated with the disclosures.303
The court also addressed Countrywide’s macroeconomic arguments.
 
304  
The court noted that the financial collapse would raise complicated issues 
on damages, but held that it would be the fact-finders’ job to apportion the 
losses proximately caused by Countrywide’s misrepresentations.305  In fact, 
the court noted, the complaint indicated that “Countrywide’s deteriorating 
lending standards were causally linked to at least some of the 
macroeconomic shifts of [the financial crisis].”306
 
 297. See Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 202–03 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); In re MBIA, Inc. Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 566, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re 
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1200–01 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
  Thus, far from holding 
that the intervening cause of the economic downturn rendered the plaintiff’s 
loss causations allegations insufficient, the court suggested that 
Countrywide was at least partially responsible for the downturn itself. 
 298. See In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 299. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[a]lthough it may be likely that a significant portion, if not 
all, of Plaintiffs’ losses were actually the result of the housing market downturn and not 
these alleged misstatements, at this stage of pleading” plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient); 
Am. Int’l Grp., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (holding that “[a]lthough Defendants may ultimately 
demonstrate that some or all of Plaintiffs’ losses are attributable to forces other than AIG and 
the Section 10(b) Defendants’ material misstatements and omissions,” the existence of 
intervening events is a matter for proof at trial (citing Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. 
Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003))).  For a discussion of Emergent and 
Lentell, see supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Countrywide Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss the 
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws 
at 50–55, In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(No. CV-07-05295), 2008 WL 2725371. 
 301. See id. at 53. 
 302. Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
 303. Id. at 1201. 
 304. Id. at 1173–74 (“For the past year, almost all Defendants have recited—at hearings 
and in their papers—that an ‘unprecedented’ external ‘liquidity crisis’ caused . . . 
Countrywide’s decline.”). 
 305. See id. at 1174. 
 306. Id. 
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There is, however, one outlier in the cases reviewed by this Note.  In In 
re Moody’s Corporation Securities Litigation,307 the district court also 
rejected the defendant’s financial crisis defense to loss causation, but its 
analysis was far different than that of other courts.308  Moody’s, a ratings 
agency, and its officers were alleged to have made misstatements and 
omissions regarding its business, independence, the method and meaning of 
its credit ratings, and the manner in which it had generated financial results 
and growth.309  Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the financial 
collapse was the “direct intervening cause” of the drop in Moody’s share 
prices, and therefore of the plaintiffs’ losses.310  The defendants relied on 
Gelt to argue that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged facts to show that 
the loss was caused by the misrepresentations, and not the intervening 
events.311
The district court denied the motion to dismiss and held that loss 
causation was adequately pled.
 
312  Significantly, however, the court did not 
rest its decision on the basis of the plaintiff pleading facts that demonstrated 
their losses were caused by the misrepresentation instead of the financial 
collapse.313  Instead, the court began by citing Lentell for the proposition 
that the question of an intervening event is reserved for trial.314  Further 
relying on Lentell, the court stated that “[w]here there is a market-wide 
downturn in a particular industry,” a plaintiff must show that their loss was 
caused by the fraud.315  The court thus framed its task as determining 
whether there was a market-wide downturn in the credit ratings industry at 
the time of the drop in stock price.316  The court compared the stock prices 
of Moody’s to those of its biggest competitor, the rating agency Standard & 
Poors, and found that S&P’s stock rose during the class period.317  The 
court thus held that it could not conclude that there was a market-wide 
downturn in the credit ratings industry, and reserved the question of the 
effect of intervening events on loss causation for trial.318
IV.  LESSONS FROM SUBPRIME SECURITIES LITIGATION 
 
This part attempts to draw some conclusions about subprime securities 
litigation from the foregoing analysis of this sampling of cases.  First, this 
part provides conclusions about the factors influencing the resolution of 
 
 307. 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 308. See id. at 512–15. 
 309. See id. at 499–501. 
 310. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the 
Consolidated Amended Complaint at 19, In re Moody’s, 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (No. 07-CV-8375), 2008 WL 5372580. 
 311. Id. at 20. 
 312. See Moody’s, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
 313. See id. at 513–14. 
 314. See id. at 513.  
 315. Id. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. 
 318. See id. at 513–14. 
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subprime securities cases discussed in Part II.  Next, this part offers 
conclusions about the effect of the financial crisis on the cases reviewed. 
A.  Dispositions 
In Part II, this Note examined the cases and determined that adequately 
pleading scienter has been the key factor in determining whether or not a 
subprime securities suit would survive dismissal.319  The plaintiffs in the 
subprime securities suits surveyed relied to an extraordinary degree on 
confidential witnesses.320  While not a guarantee of success, when the 
confidential witnesses were described with enough particularity to allow the 
court to determine their bases of knowledge, the complaint was likely to 
survive the motion to dismiss, while failure to do so was likely to result in 
dismissal.321
Similarly, position-based inferences could aid a plaintiff in pleading 
scienter, but only insofar as such inferences were supported by 
particularized facts pointing to knowledge on the part of the defendants.
 
322  
Allegations based solely on a defendant’s high rank were rejected.323  The 
required particularized facts were often themselves provided by confidential 
witnesses.324
Finally, Part II discussed two points of divergence between the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals that surfaced in the district court decisions surveyed by 
this Note.
 
325  Yet neither played a particularly important role in determining 
the outcome of the cases examined.  Those courts that noted the 
disagreement on confidential witnesses analyzed the witness statements for 
particularity without the disregard espoused by the Seventh Circuit, while 
most district courts did not acknowledge this disagreement at all.326  Given 
the importance of confidential witnesses to securities plaintiffs, and the 
ability that district courts have shown to discern their reliability, courts 
should be hesitant to undercut witness utilization.  Moreover, the concerns 
cited by the Seventh Circuit—that the confidential witnesses may have 
“axes to grind” or may not even exist327—could apply equally to named 
witnesses at the motion to dismiss phase, where the court must accept all 
the plaintiff’s allegations as true and refrain from deciding disputed issues 
of fact.328
 
 319. See supra notes 
  The instruction in Tellabs to consider competing inferences 
should not change the basic inquiry on a motion to dismiss. 
179–81 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 321. See supra notes 183–97 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 323. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 198–203 (discussing disagreement between the circuits on the use of 
confidential witnesses) and notes 217–42 (discussing core operations inference) and 
accompanying text. 
 326. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
2011] BLAME THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 311 
Additionally, while the core operations inference aided plaintiffs in some 
cases, it was usually not enough in and of itself to plead scienter without the 
support of other particularized facts.329  Even in Countrywide, the court 
took pains to emphasize the “extraordinary” nature of that situation.330  If 
the use of the core operations inference spreads to other circuits, as 
decisions in the Southern District of New York suggest it may,331
B.  The Financial Crisis and 10b-5 Securities Litigation 
 the 
doctrine should remain limited to extraordinary cases lest the scienter 
inquiry become too focused on a defendant’s position at the company, 
rather than his knowledge of facts belying his public statements. 
One might have expected the unique situation of the financial crisis to 
dominate the litigation that followed in its wake.  But in this sampling of 
cases, the factors examined in Part II of this Note played a more important 
role in determining the outcome of subprime securities suits than did the 
crisis itself.  Still, some lessons can be gleaned that may help guide the way 
forward as courts attempt to deal with the flood of litigation stemming from 
the collapse. 
1.  Scienter 
In dealing with the aftermath of a financial catastrophe, it is entirely 
proper for courts to decline to hold defendants responsible for failing to 
predict the unpredictable.  This effort to avoid hindsight bias, however, 
should not translate into a free pass for defendants to escape otherwise 
meritorious claims.  Simply put, there is no principled reason why it should 
be any easier or more difficult to plead scienter in the wake of a market-
wide downturn:  properly applied, the inquiry should focus on what facts 
were known to the defendants at the time of the alleged misrepresentations. 
The In re Radian decision thus contains some questionable reasoning that 
courts should avoid.332  The district court there relied upon the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Gelt for its much-cited proposition that “when the 
plaintiff’s loss coincides with a marketwide phenomenon causing 
comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that the plaintiff’s loss 
was caused by the fraud decreases.”333
 
 329. See supra notes 
  Contrary to its usage by the Radian 
court, the Gelt decision concerned loss causation, not scienter.  This is not 
to say that the court necessarily reached the wrong result in granting 
dismissal, but its analysis was flawed on this point.  Unlike loss causation, 
which is directly affected by the company’s stock price, scienter is not 
inextricably intertwined with the conditions of the market; thus the analysis 
217–42 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 333. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994); see 
supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
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of whether scienter is adequately pled should remain limited to what the 
defendants knew and when they knew it. 
On the other hand, the approach in Thornburg should also be avoided.334  
The motive cited by the court—survival of the financial collapse—is one 
that every defendant in a management position would possess.335  Taken to 
an extreme, every defendant in a management position could face liability 
following a market downturn.  Thus, considering such vague motives as 
“survival” to be facts indicative of a strong inference of scienter would 
undermine the main goal of the PSLRA:  preventing strike suits.336
In the end, courts attempting to ascertain whether a plaintiff has pleaded 
a strong inference of scienter in the wake of financial catastrophe should 
walk a middle path.  The financial crisis should serve only to provide 
context to the plaintiff’s factual allegations, whether as an element of the 
plaintiff’s allegations or as a competing inference to be considered under 
Tellabs.  Where, as in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, those factual 
allegations are found to be sparse and conclusory, it is entirely appropriate 
to dismiss, as mere knowledge of a general economic trend should not 
suffice to allege scienter.
 
337  This does not mean, however, that such 
knowledge may never contribute to a successful pleading of scienter:  
where, as in Citigroup and MoneyGram,338
2.  Loss Causation 
 that knowledge is demonstrated 
by particularized facts belying the defendant’s public statements, the claims 
should be allowed to proceed. 
As for loss causation in the wake of the financial collapse, two 
conclusions may be drawn.  First, the financial crisis defense against loss 
causation simply has not proved persuasive where plaintiffs have 
adequately pleaded the other elements of a 10b-5 action.339  Second, it is 
clear that circuit courts should provide district courts with more guidance 
with respect to how a plaintiff must account for intervening causes when 
pleading loss causation.  In the sampling of decisions reviewed by this 
Note, loss causation has not proved as important as scienter.  Nevertheless, 
the contrast between the in-depth analysis conducted by the district court in 
In re Security Capital Assurance, Ltd., Securities Litigation340 and the 
comparatively superficial analysis conducted by other courts indicates a 
lack of clarity.341  This guidance should first come from the Second Circuit, 
whose unclear passage in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.342
 
 334. See supra notes 
 has been widely 
260–64 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 276–83 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 283–91 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 295–306 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
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cited by defendants and district courts around the country as they attempt to 
resolve the effect of the financial crisis on pleading loss causation.343
Whatever form this guidance may take, it should not follow the reasoning 
of In re Moody’s.
 
344  The analysis adopted by the district court in that case 
is questionable in a number of respects.  First, the methodology adopted—
comparing the stock price of the defendant to that of the defendant’s 
competitors to determine if there was a downturn in a particular industry—
finds little support in Lentell.345  The relevant language in Lentell states that 
an “an intervening event, like a general fall in the price of internet 
stocks . . . is a matter of proof at trial and not to be decided on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,” while a “marketwide phenomenon causing 
similar losses to other investors” decreases the chances the plaintiff’s losses 
were caused by the fraud.346  The Moody’s court, however, held that a 
downturn in a particular industry would require plaintiffs to rule out 
intervening events in order to survive a motion to dismiss.347  While Lentell 
is certainly unclear, it is difficult to see how a downturn in a particular 
industry can constitute a marketwide phenomenon.348
Moreover, even if the language can be stretched to support such a 
reading, applying this comparative methodology would be bad policy.  
Fraud may be committed by one company in an industry that happens to 
suffer a downturn, or by every company in that industry—indeed, one 
might argue that this aptly describes the demise of the subprime lending 
industry.
 
349  Under the analysis adopted by the Moody’s court, the plaintiffs 
in Countrywide may not have been able to survive the motion to dismiss 
despite well-pleaded allegations of large-scale fraud; all other mortgage 
lenders were also hit hard by the crisis.350  Additionally, defining what 
constitutes a “particular industry” is difficult; this is evident in Moody’s 
itself, where the court compared Moody’s stock price with just one 
competitor.351
In weighing the effect an intervening cause has on loss causation, district 
courts should remember that the question on a motion to dismiss is whether 
the defendant’s misdeeds caused a loss, not how much of a loss the 
defendant may have caused.
 
352  While the Supreme Court in Dura required 
that a plaintiff distinguish the loss caused by the misrepresentation from the 
“tangle of other factors” affecting the price, it also noted that pleading loss 
causation should not prove a great burden on plaintiffs.353
 
 343. See supra notes 
  Thus, while 
277–82 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 308–18 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 346. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005); see supra notes 120–26 
and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the role of fraud in subprime 
defaults). 
 350. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra Part I.B.4.a.i. 
 353. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
314 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
dismissal may be appropriate in cases like HomeBanc where plaintiffs 
utterly failed to provide the court with facts allowing the court to apportion 
the loss caused by the defendants’ misstatements,354
CONCLUSION 
 plaintiffs should not 
have to hire expert witnesses to conduct complicated analyses at the motion 
to dismiss phase. 
Motions to dismiss are only the first chapter in securities litigation arising 
out of the financial collapse, a chapter not yet fully written.  The cases 
surveyed in this Note highlight the legal issues that will influence the 
resolution of 10b-5 claims for subprime securities losses as investors 
continue to seek recompense for the harm they suffered in the subprime 
mortgage meltdown and ensuing credit crisis.  Indeed, as Circuit Courts of 
Appeals begin to weigh in, the issues arising out of subprime securities suits 
may ultimately shape the contours of the private 10b-5 action as it 
continues to evolve from its origins in the Great Depression. 
 
 
 354. See supra notes 292–94 and accompanying text. 
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